Two and half years ago, when Stephen Elop was brought in to lead Nokia, many asked the question openly if Elop was the trojan horse for Microsoft. Though Elop publicly denied that charge at that time, Nokia's journey for last two and half years with him at the helm, has however reached the conclusion that many feared with announcement that Microsoft is buying Nokia mobile business at $7.2 billion and Stephen Elop returning to Microsoft. With Steve Ballmer's announcement of retirement, people are making simple arithmetic with Stephen Elop. We, humans, are good in drawing sweeping conclusion based on only 2-3 data points and this is also no exception to that rule. Truth, as often is found to lie somewhere in between.
The legacy of Elop in Nokia is hardly anything to be jealous about. Since he came on board, Nokia's valuation came down by 85%, the market space where Nokia was world leader, saw Nokia receding ground to Samsung and other OEMs. The smartphone space which was the key element driving Nokia to cannibalize Symbiosis and embrace Windows OS, decidedly went with Apple's iOS and Google's Android. Now did anyone know for sure that these were going to happen when Elop came on board?
Social psychologists use the term Fundamental Attribution Error to our natural bias to attribute personal disposition instead of situational artifacts as a cause of certain eventuality. We feel higher satisfaction if we can find someone to hold responsible for an event that we do not like. So we feel doubly eager to attribute Nokia's ill-fate to Elop. Psychologists also tell us that that bias changes when one is involved and is answerable for the course of event. In the scenario where the person is involved, it is often observed that he/she attributes the cause of events to the situational changes instead of his/her own decisions. That means, Stephen Elop will attribute the cause of the present state of Nokia to the changing situations!
Rational minds would ask, "Was the decision taken only by Elop? Would Nokia board agree to allow Elop to take the decision if they knew they had better alternatives [other than going windows way] two and half years back?"
Given that the board members had access to all the information that Elop had, it is reasonable to assume that each member individually vetted all the different options in their personal capacity before agreeing to Elop's solution. What Elop most likely have done at that time is that he influenced these members in evaluating the potentials and risks that each option provided. He might have been successful in creating fear for future failure in sticking to existing course. He might have projected the value of Windows and Microsoft alliance much higher than it actually was. But ownership of the course steering lies with all the executive members of Nokia board.
Once the decision was taken, it was clear which path Nokia is heading. Mounting accumulated losses, market pressure, competition from Apple, Samsung and other Android-based smartphone OEMs took Nokia further away from its root and towards further grip of Microsoft.
But did Elop think that bringing Nokia mobile to Microsoft could make him a strong candidate for Ballmer's successor? Even if he did, how much could he bet that course of events will take the shape the way it happened when he took the plunge 2.5 years back? Nobody realistically could be sure. At most, he could do is play his cards the way he played and hope things will eventually take him to the coveted post that he might have been eying for.
Now how does this change for Microsoft? Would this bring the hardware success that eluded Microsoft and Ballmer all along? Well, fact is Nokia Lumia series with windows 8 has become a success. It is capturing market quite fast, providing a credible alternative to Android based smartphones, even at lower cost point. Merger in fact positions Lumia at stronger ground with control on both smartphone hardware and OS. It will give Lumia leverage to bring price of smartphone further down and present a credible competition to Android-based low cost phones in all emerging markets where the real smartphone battle has to be fought and won.
It will also help Microsoft to boost its advertising business where the battle with Google is being fought, by making advertisement more personalized for the users by integrating smartphone's on-device data with skydrive [Microsoft Cloud] and Outlook [Microsoft email]. But for this to work, Microsoft's existing strong culture of internal competition [and therefore wastage of creative bandwidth in political rivalry] must change and find a way to work like collaborative set of engineering/business functions. Lumia hardware engineering must be allowed to function independently of Windows software division for them to build on each other's strength. But if this strategy succeeds, Microsoft will have evolved itself for the new generation of users and move to a new position of strength.
So, good luck to Mr. Elop and RIP Nokia mobile [that's a bit hurtful for someone who always used Nokia handsets]!
The next news to watch is who is going to buy Blackberry/RIM!
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